Abstract-In the field of computer security, a problem that received little attention so far is the enforcement of confidentiality properties by supervisory control. Given a critical system that may leak confidential information, the problem consists in designing a controller , possibly disabling occurrences of a fixed subset of events of , so that the closed-loop system does not leak confidential information. We consider this problem in the case where is a finite transition system with set of events 6 and an inquisitive user, called the adversary, observes a subset 6 of 6. The confidential information is the fact (when it is true) that the trace of the execution of on 6 belongs to a regular set 6 , called the secret. The secret is said to be opaque w.r.t.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE development of infrastructures like the Internet or the mobile phone networks has led to the emergence of sophisticated on-line services providing information access or decision taking facilities. Such networks are open by nature and therefore vulnerable to malicious users. All the same, security and confidence in security are essential to distant services such as e-voting, on-line payment, or medical information storage. Such services handle indeed critical information that should be neither erased nor corrupted nor leaked to unauthorized users. Confidence in the security of a service relies on and requires some certification of security. Manual validation is expensive, may be impossible for large systems, and is permeable to mistakes. The development of automatic tools serving to analyze or to ensure the security of services has become crucial to discover and avoid security breaches. In this context, there has been growing interest in the formal verification of security properties [1] - [3] and in their model-based testing [4] - [8] . 1 Manuscript received January 13, 2009 ; revised June 19, 2009 and August 24, 2009 . First published February 02, 2010; current version published May 12, 2010 . This work was supported in part by the Politess RNRT project. Recommended by Associate Editor S. Reveliotis.
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Security properties are generally classified into three different categories [9] :
• availability (a user can always perform legal actions);
• integrity (a user can never perform illegal actions);
• confidentiality (a user cannot discover or infer the secret information). Consider the case of an e-voting system. Ensuring that the votes cannot be modified by a third party is a concern of integrity. Ensuring that every elector can vote is a concern of availability. Ensuring that is not possible for a third party to discover the vote of an elector is a concern of confidentiality.
In this paper, we focus on confidentiality and especially on opacity, a central notion that was introduced in [10] and adapted to transition systems in [11] . Given a transition system, consider an observation map that projects runs to observations, and a specific subset of runs called the secret, with the meaning that the observed behavior of the system should never disclose when its actual behavior belongs to this set. The secret is said to be opaque if the projection of every run in this set coincides with the projection of some run outside the set. Then, an adversary who observes the run of the system cannot safely infer from this (partial) observation that the run belongs to the secret. More specific notions of opacity, like initial opacity or K-step opacity have been introduced in [12] , [13] . At the same time, the notion of opacity defined in [10] is general enough to allow other notions like anonymity (strong or weak as defined in [14] ) and strong non-deterministic non-interference [15] to be expressed as opacity for suitable secrets and observation maps [11] . Note that opacity is more or less dual to diagnosability [16] , [17] , that consists in deciding whether the actual run of the system belongs to the secret from a bounded extension of this run.
Our purpose in this paper is not to model-check transition systems for opacity properties but to enforce such properties on transition systems by supervisory control. According to Ramadge and Wonham's theory presented in [18] , [19] , the aim of supervisory control is to enforce a safety property on a transition system. This is achieved by defining a map that determines after each incomplete run of the system the set of actions which may be taken without compromising the safety property. All uncontrollable actions must be in this set. This control map is generally expected to be as permissible as possible, i.e. no unnecessary restriction should be imposed on the system. If successful termination of runs is taken into account, the control map should moreover be non-blocking, meaning that it should not prevent the system from eventually reaching some final state. Within Ramadge and Wonham's framework, the computational aspects of supervisory control have been investigated mainly for finite transition systems and regular safety properties. In this case, the control map can be computed in a regular form, yielding a finite state supervisor. The expected controlled system is then the product of the uncontrolled system and supervisor .
0018-9286/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE Applying supervisory control to enforce confidentiality properties is an emerging field of research. In [20] , the author adapts the decentralized supervisory control theory in order to ensure the Chinese Wall Policy, whereas in [21] , the authors focus on (bisimulation-based) strong non-deterministic non-interference properties. Attempts to adapt supervisory control to opacity have been made in [22] - [24] . In these works, one considers a finite and deterministic labeled transition system over an alphabet , a regular set (the secret) and a subset (the alphabet of the adversary), and one searches for a finite state supervisor enforcing the opacity of w.r.t. the natural projection from to (by the opacity of we mean the opacity of the set of runs with traces in ). In this setting, represents a system running in the scope of an inquisitive adversary. The adversary observes all actions in and tries to infer from these partial observations the knowledge that the trace of the run of is in the secret set . For instance, may be the driver of a semi-autonomous agent that travels through a finite network, and is the set of incoming paths to a region of the network that should not be identified as the current region of the agent without compromising efficiency (the task of the agent may be to keep watch on a shopping center with two types of stores, specialized either in jewels or in candies, and thieves should not know when jewels stores are without supervision) or continuity of the service (the agent should not fall in an ambush). For another illustration, may be a voting system with a finite set of voters, numbered from 1 to , where the sequence of voters is random and may be observed (votes are not observable). Suppose that voting may be stopped at any time when it is certain that further voting would not change the result, which is then published. Let elementary votes be represented as pairs or . Let , respectively, be the sets of sequences in which the last vote is , respectively, . Enforcing the joint opacity of and prevents from stopping whenever this would reveal some vote or . One subtlety lays in the additional assumption that the adversary knows exactly the system and the supervisor . This means that new confidential information may be inferred by the adversary from the knowledge of and the partial observation of the run of the controlled system, and to avoid such leakage, one must iterate the controller construction. Hence the exact problem is to find a supervisor that enforces the opacity of w.r.t. and the projection from to , and this is an intrinsically circular problem because the control objective cannot be expressed without an explicit reference to the controller (this is not true when the control objective is a safety property).
The non-blocking property of the supervisor (another circular problem) was ignored in the works cited above. We shall not address this issue in the present paper, where we still consider finite transition systems, regular secrets and natural projections.
The intrinsic circularity of the supervisory control problem for opacity makes it impossible to give a general solution to this problem by direct application of Ramadge and Wonham's methods. 2 These methods were designed for enforcing integrity properties on plants. Nevertheless, the Ramadge and Wonham's theory can be used directly for enforcing opacity properties when (1) or (2) where respectively, denote the subsets of actions that can be controlled respectively, observed by the supervisor [24] . In both cases, the language of the optimal supervisor may be computed by a first fixpoint iteration, yielding the supremal sublanguage of with respect to which is opaque, followed by a second fixpoint iteration, yielding the supremal controllable and normal sublanguage of . Conditions less restrictive than (2) have been elaborated in [23] to the same effect.
In the remaining situations, a non-trivial adaptation of Ramadge and Wonham's methods is necessary. Some of the difficulties encountered are described in [24] where a specific control synthesis algorithm is defined for the case . The purpose of this paper is to propose a new algorithm producing a most permissive and regular supervisory control for opacity in the more general case where both and but and are not necessarily comparable.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II fixes some notations, introduces the notion of opacity and presents the opacity control problem. Section III provides a reduction of the opacity control problem to the same problem under full observation. Section IV presents informally the constructions needed to synthesize the controller. Section V is the core of the paper and presents the detailed construction and the formal justification of a solution to the opacity control problem. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notations and Definitions
Henceforth, is a finite alphabet of actions (denoted and the like), is a deterministic transition system labeled in , with a finite set of states , an initial state , and a partial transition map . A (partial or incomplete) run of is a finite non-empty sequence alternatively consisting of states and actions such that is defined for and it is equal to for . The trace of the run is the word . The trace of the empty run is the empty word . The language of is the set of all traces of runs of and it is denoted . As is a deterministic labeled transition system (or LTS), runs and traces of runs are in bijective correspondence. The words in may therefore, by an abuse of terminology, be called traces of .
Opacity control aims at preventing an inquisitive user, called the adversary, from obtaining or inferring confidential information on the execution of from a partial observation of this run. Note that a controlled system might also be written since is indeed the parallel composition of the plant and the controller .
B. The Definition of Opacity
Consider an LTS over and a subalphabet . The alphabet is the set of actions supplied to the user for interacting synchronously with , i.e. for observing the runs of . One wants to hide from the user some confidential property of runs, e.g. that a run has never visited some state, or that some action has always been immediately followed in the run by some other action , or that some high-level action occurred in the run (according to the terminology for non-interference used in [15] ). Such a confidential property of runs may be represented abstractly as a non-empty and regular subset , which we call a secret. As the user is possibly inquisitive, we call him the adversary.
If, for some trace of , belongs to but does not belong to , then the adversary knows from the observation of the trace that this trace belongs to , i.e. the trace discloses the secret to the adversary. In the converse case, no confidential information is leaked and the secret is said to be opaque w.r.t.
and . Let us state a more precise definition of opacity. Example 1: Let be the automaton depicted in Fig. 1 , thus , , is defined by the labeled edges,
, and (the traces in lead to the squared configurations in Fig. 1 ). Let . Then is not opaque w.r.t. and , since e.g. for the observation , the only possible trace is . Similarly, for the observation , the only possible traces are and which both belong to the secret . Finally, the trace belongs to but it does not disclose the secret, since and does not belong to . For another illustration of the concept of opacity, imagine that models a hardware/software system with a bug that cannot be fixed because it is in the hardware and is the set of traces of all runs in which the bug occurs, i.e. the secret is the run-time extension of the bug. If is opaque w.r.t.
, then a user who can only observe the actions in will never identify any consequence of the bug. In the converse case, the best one can do is to hide the bug by wrapping in a software interface, restricting the behavior of and ensuring in this way that and hence the bug cannot be disclosed any more. This can always be done in view of the following proposition. Proposition 1 ([22] ): Given a system and a set of traces , there always exists a supremal prefix-closed sublanguage of such that is opaque w.r.t. and , namely the language . The proof of this proposition follows from the definition of opacity and Remark 2.
C. Opacity Control Problem
Given a system and a secret , our goal is to enforce the opacity of on by supervisory control. The search space for possible controls over is determined by two subsets of , a subset of controllable actions and a subset of observable actions. It is assumed that after a run of with trace , the information available for controlling the next action of is the observed trace , where is the natural projection from to . A control is a map from observed traces to subsets of such that only the supersets of can appear in the range of (this restriction reflects that a controller can never disable any uncontrollable action). Applying the control to means disabling after all actions which do not belong to . We let denote the induced restriction of the language generated by under the control .
Remark 3: If is a (possibly infinite) LTS such that , where is any LTS such that , then . The LTS is called a controller, and the parallel composition is often written to stress this interpretation. Indeed, and determine each other up to the constraint . So, one can work indifferently with control maps or with controllers .
The problem we want to solve may be described roughly as follows.
Problem 1: Given a finite deterministic transition system labeled over , a regular subset (the secret), and three subalphabets , and of , compute a most permissive control such that is opaque w.r.t. and . A classical Ramadge and Wonham's theorem states that a prefix-closed sublanguage of may be obtained as the induced restriction of the language generated by under some control (in formulas, ) if and only if is controllable and observable according to the definitions below (for a complete presentation of supervisory control, the reader is referred e.g. to [25] [24]; 4) [24] . In cases (1), (2) and (3), is obtained by computing first the supremal sublanguage of with respect to which is opaque (given by Proposition 1), and next the supremal controllable and normal sublanguage of the former. In case (4), on account of the assumption that the adversary knows exactly the control map, it would be necessary to iterate further the two operations and in alternation, but it has been shown in [24] that such an iteration may not stabilize, and a non-trivial adaptation of Ramadge and Wonham's methods was in fact necessary to compute with an algorithm that always terminates.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that as in all cases listed in Proposition 2. We also suppose that , meaning that a controller has at least as precise information as the adversary on the actual run of . But we do not suppose that and are comparable, thus jointly extending conditions (2), (3) and (4) of Proposition 2. The exact problem which we want to solve may finally be stated as follows:
Problem 2 (Opacity Control Problem): Given a finite deterministic transition system labeled over , a regular subset (the secret), a subalphabet (the actions which a controller can observe), and two arbitrary subalphabets (the actions which a controller can disable) and (the actions visible to the adversary), let denote the set of non-empty prefix-closed sublanguages of such that is controllable w.r.t. and , is normal w.r.t. and , and is opaque w.r.t. and . The problem is twofold. i) Show that it is decidable whether is empty. ii) Show that for non-empty , the union of all languages in is a regular language , and construct from and a finite state machine generating . At this stage, we would like to indicate briefly potential applications. In the security literature, opacity is usually considered in the context of infinite systems, including for instance unbounded Petri nets. As opacity is not decidable in general [11] , the best one can do is often model-checking systems for sufficient opacity conditions. A complementary technique would be to enforce opacity by supervisory control on finite abstractions of infinite systems and then to lift control to the original systems for subsequent model-checking. A field of direct application of regular opacity control is the guidance of semi-autonomous agents traveling through finite networks, with the objective of preventing current positions from being known to adversaries that receive partial information from sensors. The technical development presented in Section V will be illustrated with a reduced example of this kind. Based on Proposition 5, whenever , one can reformulate the opacity control problem in terms of the abstract system induced by the observation map and a new secret derived from , solve the problem in this abstract setting, and lift up the solution to the original setting as .
IV. AN INFORMAL PRESENTATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we sketch the intuitions under the methods that will be employed for solving Problem 2. Henceforth, based on Proposition 5, we assume w.l.o.g. that . Moreover, we assume that the transition system recognizes the secret , i.e.
such that for any , iff is defined and iff . This second condition, even though it does not hold for arbitrary and , always holds for the parallel composition of and a complete deterministic automaton recognizing .
Let denote the set of all non-empty prefix-closed and controllable languages such that is opaque w.r.t. and . It was observed in Section II that, if differs from the empty set, then is in . We want to construct a finite automaton that generates , showing that this language is regular and providing as a by-product the most permissive control enforcing the opacity of w.r.t. and . In case when , no control on can enforce the opacity of . In order to avoid this special case, we assume henceforth that and is defined only for . This property may always be enforced on by adding if necessary a dummy transition from a dummy initial state to the actual initial state of . In this way, the condition is replaced equivalently with the condition . The latter condition may of course be decided upon from any automaton generating . As is the set of traces of recognized by the accepting states in , a trace discloses the secret to the adversary if . Therefore, if for every . The usual method for testing this is to construct an LTS as indicated in Definition 1, and to check that no reachable state is a subset of . In case when for some , a first and necessary step towards computing is to compute the LTS , thus matching the system with the dynamic estimation of its current state by the adversary. This LTS, equipped with the set of accepting states , recognizes exactly the set of traces which disclose the secret .
Let us explain more precisely the contribution brought by the LTS to the construction of a control map enforcing the opacity of . Define . The initial state of is the pair defined with , and the reachability set of is the inductive closure of the set under the partial transition map (where ). When a run with trace is performed in , the matching run of leads to a pair where is the state reached by and is the most accurate estimate of that can be computed by an adversary knowing and . Therefore, the adversary can disclose the secret if and only if has at least one loosing path, that is a path leading to a loosing configuration such that . Here and in the sequel, the term configuration is used as a synonym of state for all automata with sets of states included in , while the term state is reserved to the elements of .
Suppose the adversary can win. One must impose on some control such that, for any in and for any action , if and is a loosing configuration of for some , then . Traces are fully observable, hence the corresponding configurations of may be used to determine the values of . It suffices indeed to track controllable actions backwards from loosing configurations on acyclic paths of , and to define such that the last controllable transition is disabled on each loosing path. Then, no loosing configuration of can be reached in , and by construction, is a superset of . However, may be larger than , because the configuration reached in by a trace does not always reflect the most accurate estimate of for an adversary knowing , and . As is strictly smaller than , may indeed be strictly larger than , and if this smaller set is included in , then the adversary can still disclose the secret in the controlled system since he knows exactly the control map .
At this stage, it would be helpful to compute an automaton generating such that each trace leads from the initial state of to the configuration given by and . 5 Unfortunately, such an automaton does not exist in general. One reason among others is that two traces inducing different control values and might nevertheless lead to the same configuration , thus preventing from generating . Example 2: To illustrate this point, consider again the system and the secret defined in Example 1. Assume now that 5 This was the construction used in [24] to deal with case (4) in Proposition 1. 
and
. The LTSs and are shown in Fig. 2 . The loosing configurations that disclose are squared. The control must disable the last controllable transition on each loosing path as indicated in dashed lines, hence , , and . In particular, and . However, an adversary who knows that is controlled by computes the same state estimate {1} for and . Now, if one lets accordingly in , then one reaches a confused situation: on the one hand, should be defined because , and on the other hand, should be undefined because ! Furthermore, even if the construction of from , in a first stage, and of from and , in a second stage, were possible, the computation of would be very slow, as we explain below. Given a trace with , suppose that such that and is not a configuration of . Suppose that from every state , exists in exactly one transition where and all the transitions from states are labeled with the same action . Although it was already evident from (as opposed to ) that, if an adversary ever gets the estimate of , then the action must be control-disabled after , this fact is ignored in the definition of the control since is not a configuration of . Example 3: Back to example 2, one may see that if, after control is imposed on , the configuration (1,{1}) may be reached in , then the secret will be disclosed by the trace in the controlled system . It is thus ultimately necessary to disable at configuration (1,{1}) (which solves at the same time the confusion encountered in Example 2).
In order to cope with these shortcomings, we will replace automata defined over subsets of with partial maps such that either or it is undefined. Each partial map generates a corresponding automaton with the initial state . The reachability set of the generated automaton is the inductive closure of the set under the partial transition map defined from as follows. Let be defined inductively with for . Let denote also the additive extension of the latter map to sets of states and to languages. We define with , if , and otherwise. Consider e.g. the automaton . We will replace this automaton with the partial transition map defined with . The map generates from an automaton isomorphic to . The isomorphism maps each state of to a similar state where the condensed state estimate is equal to if and otherwise to . Note that the map may also serve to generate sequences of transitions from initial configurations that cannot be reached in but may play a role later on during the iterative computation of the optimal control.
Continuing to mimic the approach in which a first control function was derived from , we will replace the computation of by the computation of a partial map , such that will be either equal to or undefined. The latter case will occur whenever is controllable and the configuration discloses the secret, i.e. when all states reached in by firing sequences in from states in are in . The automaton generated by the map from can now play the role that we had assigned to our ghost automaton .
Proceeding similarly from , we will construct an inductive sequence of partial maps such that or it is undefined. These maps induce a corresponding sequence of finite automata , generated from , with decreasing languages . As there exist finitely many partial maps from to , the decreasing sequence stabilizes, i.e. for some . Let and for the least such , then we will prove that , thus showing that the most permissive control enforcing the opacity of is regular. 6 We would like to complete this informal presentation of the results and constructions stated in Section V by explaining a little more the intuitions under state estimates in pairs . In such pairs, is best envisaged as the set of states that an adversary feels may have reached immediately after the last action he has observed in some trace of with partially observed prefix . Suppose the adversary moreover knows that the control imposed on after his last observed action in agrees with , i.e. that behaves according to the sequences of transitions defined by from 6 We recall that K is always non-empty owing to the assumptions made in the beginning of this section.
the configuration . Then, the estimate provides him enough information to determine all states that might have been reached in under the same control by executing arbitrary traces such that and . The reason why we have chosen to work with condensed state estimates is that this facilitates greatly the construction of the partial transition map from the control map . For any , the state estimate in is indeed the set of states that an adversary believes may have reached under the control after the last action in the trace . Finally, we would like to give intuitions about the structure of the automaton . The set of reachable states of this automaton may be partitioned into disjoint subsets such that if and only if . For each , the full restriction of induced on is isomorphic to a subautomaton of , where the isomorphism maps to . The automaton may therefore be seen as a mode automaton, with one mode per estimate . In each mode , the automaton exerts state based control on until, at some state , it enables some action which the adversary is aware of. Then jumps to a new mode , reflecting the new condensed estimate gained by the adversary, and it enters at such that in . The new mode is . Note that the adversary's view of is isomorphic to the quotient of obtained by removing first all transitions with labels in and then collapsing to a single state for each mode . by definition of . Remark 5: If in the sense that is defined and equal to whenever the latter is defined, then for any , entails that for some . Therefore, . Example 4: Let be the transition system depicted in Fig. 3 , with , , , and . Let be the partial map defined according to the arcs of the picture.
V. THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
may be seen as a representation Throughout the section, we let with . The following three lemmas show that if a sequence of transitions , , is generated from using the transition map , then for each , is the best estimate of the state that the adversary can obtain from and the knowledge that . and . This is so because and is not controllable. The resulting automaton is depicted in Fig. 5 . It is important to note that the emptiness of the set may be checked on the finite automaton generated by the partial transition map from the initial state . Definition 10: Let for the least such that where and is the map defined with .
Example 10:
Given that , contains exactly one loosing estimate, namely the singleton set {1}. Thus, and is undefined. The automaton is depicted in Fig. 6 . The reader may verify that . is an automaton with set of reachable states included in the finite set .
With Theorems 1 and 2, we have reached the objectives announced in Sections I and IV. Namely, the control induced by the automaton is the optimal control enforcing the opacity of on , and this control is regular.
Example 11: The optimal control defined by the automaton prevents the agent from using the lift of the south wing, and it also prevents the agent from using the lift of the north wing from the second floor to the third floor at any time after he has used this lift downwards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given a system modeled by a finite transition system over , a regular secret and an adversary observing a subset of the events of , we have addressed the problem of computing the supremal controller that enforces the opacity of on while observing and controlling respective subsets and of events of . Assuming that , we have shown that this supremal controller is regular. The question is open whether the supremal controller is still regular and effectively computable when and are not comparable. We would like to add that the control synthesis algorithm which has been proposed can be easily adapted to enforce the joint opacity of several regular secrets (recognized by corresponding subsets of states of ). This may serve, e.g., to hide the current position of a token traveling through a graph with vertices, or to stipulate that no bit of a secret data byte should be leaked (by requiring the joint opacity of some predicate representing this data byte and of the complementary predicate). This covers also the notion of secrecy as defined in [26] . The non-blocking property of supervisors was ignored in this work. However, under full observation (i.e. when ), a straightforward adaptation of our work suffices to enforce also the deadlock-freeness of the controlled system . It suffices indeed to state in Definition 9 that is undefined whenever and some deadlocked configuration can be reached from by some uncontrollable sequence of events . 7 Many applications in which security issues cannot be ignored deal with infinite data types. Such systems or services are naturally modeled with infinite transition systems. In order to avoid that confidential information leaks from such infinite systems, it seems important to investigate combined techniques of opacity control and abstract interpretation. A possible scheme is to enforce opacity by supervisory control on finite abstractions of infinite systems and then to lift control to the original systems for subsequent model-checking. 
